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I
INTRODUCTION
The nation is in the midst of a fervent national debate over how
universities should respond to "hate speech" on campuses.I "Hate speech" is
the generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks based on
race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference. 2 This article
analyzes this debate in two stages. The analysis begins by examining the
existing state of first amendment jurisprudence regarding hate speech,
exploring the doctrines that currently combine to protect such speech, the
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1. The debate has been prominent at virtually every college and university in the country in the
last two years. See generally Steve France, Hate Goes to College, ABAJ 44 (July 1990); Connie Leslie,
Lessons from Bigotry 101: Racism on Campus, Newsweek 48-49 (September 25, 1989); Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith Civil Rights Division, Campus Anti-Bias Codes: A New Form of Censorship? (1989)
(policy background report); Crowd at Homecoming Boos Black Queen, Chron Higher Educ A2 (November
8, 1989); Cheryl M. Fields, Colleges Advised to Develop Strong Procedures to Deal With Incidents of Racial
Harassment, Chron Higher Educ AIl (July 20, 1988); Robin Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies
Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues, Chron Higher Educ AI (October 4, 1989). It has received
abundant attention in editorial pages. See, for example, Nat Hentoff, Campus Follies. From Free Speech
.... Washington Post A23 (November 4, 1989); George F. Will, Liberal Censorship, Washington Post
C7 (November 5, 1989); Debra Everson, On Outlawing Hate Speech, Guild Notes 9
(November/December 1989); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Debates Over Placing Limits on Racist Speech
Must Not Ignore the Damage It Does to Its Victims, Chron Higher Educ BI (October 25, 1989); James T.
Laney, Why Tolerate Campus Bigots?, New York Times A35 (April 6, 1990); Paul R. Verkuil, Free to
Speak, but Willing to Listen and Learn, New York Times A28 (April 25, 1990).
2. The issues latent in this definition, such as whether racial epithets should qualify as
"speech" for constitutional purposes, are discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-57. The
debate over hate speech has spawned a rich body of scholarly literature. See, for example, Kammy
Au, Freedom from Fear, 15 Lincoln L Rev 45 (1984); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Insults
and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 Rutgers L Rev 287 (1990); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech
and Racism, 8 Cardozo L Rev 445 (1987); Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big
Brother Should Butt In, 23 Duquesne L Rev 77 (1984); Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke LJ 431; Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev 123 (1990); Toni M. Massaro,
Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 211 (1991); MariJ.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320 (1989);
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 267 (1991);
Dean M. Richardson, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61 Ore L Rev 267 (1982); Rodney A. Smolla,
Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev 171 (1990);
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke LJ 484; R. George
Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 Miss Col L Rev 1 (1988); Note, A Communitarian Defense
of Group Libel Laws, 101 Harv L Rev 682 (1988).
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theoretical principles underlying those doctrines, and the narrow range of
recognized exceptions to constitutional protection for speech that might, in
some circumstances, permit hate speech to be punished.
The second stage of the analysis examines the relationship of these first
amendment doctrines to notions of academic freedom at both state and
private universities. Do the free speech rules prevailing in the general
marketplace apply with equal force on university campuses? Or are there first
amendment principles that either require or permit a different response to
hate speech on campus than current first amendment doctrines allow in other
contexts?3
II
HATE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Contrasting "Affirmative" and "Negative" First Amendment
Jurisprudence
1. The "Affirmative" Side of Free Speech. The "affirmative" side of first
amendment jurisprudence approaches free speech issues by emphasizing a
group of interrelated doctrines that have combined, in modern times, to
create a constitutional jurisprudence highly protective of freedom of speech. 4
The affirmative side begins with the mindset that speech is presumptively
protected against any restraint or punishment, and regards any encroachment
with intense skepticism.
3. One of the principal issues in contemporary academic life is the question of the extent to
which concepts of academic freedom have constitutional status. See, for example, University of
Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577, 586-87 & n6 (1990); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern of the First Amendment, " 99 Yale LJ 251 (1989); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution:
Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tex L Rev 1265 (1988); David M. Rabban, A
Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L &
Contemp Probs 227 (Summer 1990); William W. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom
and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed, The Concept of Academic Freedom 59 (Univ
of Texas Press, 1972); Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loyola L Rev 831 (1987).
The issues in this debate are complicated, and their resolution will be influenced by, among other
factors, whether the university in question is public or private. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S Ct
at 587 n6 (suggesting that attempts by government to control the content of speech on private
universities involve a different constitutional balance than regulation on public campuses, where
government has interests both as a speaker and as the regulator). This article does not attempt to
join issue on this generic question, but rather is limited to the specific legal and policy conflicts posed
by hate speech. On a state university campus, regulation of hate speech is constrained directly by the
first amendment. Since government is also in some contexts a "speaker" at a state university campus
(as when a faculty member is speaking for the university), striking the appropriate first amendment
balance is often complex. See notes 112-19 and accompanying text. A private university, of course,
is not legally bound by the first amendment. When discussing the rules governing hate speech that a
private university sets for itself, therefore, no issues of constitutional law are formally implicated.
While not of first amendment dimension, the policy conflicts posed by hate speech regulations at
private universities are, however, no different than those at public institutions. This article thus
proceeds on the premise that the resolution of those conflicts pressed here are of equal validity for
both public and private universities. See note 87 and accompanying text.
4. For an insightful and accessible illustration of the principle contending schools of first
amendment interpretation during the past several decades, see William W. Van Alstyne,
Interpretations of the First Amendment 21-40 (Duke Univ Press, 1984).
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The affirmative first amendment thinker is constantly looking for ways to
stretch existing doctrines to embrace wider and wider protection for speech.
Affirmative thinkers are unlikely to rest the justification for freedom of speech
on any one theory, but instead point to a cluster of rationales for treating
freedom of speech as a specially preferred social value. 5 Most importantly,
the affirmative side of first amendment jurisprudence emphasizes both the
social value of free speech to the collective good and the private value of free
speech to the individual. 6
As a collective value, freedom of speech serves the general social interest
in the pursuit of truth through the "marketplace of ideas." 7 Free speech also
serves as a check on tyranny," and is the lifeblood of democratic self-
governance. 9 These collective theories justify free speech as a means to an
end. But free speech is also an end in itself, an end intimately intertwined
with human autonomy and dignity.' 0 Free speech is thus especially valuable
for reasons that have nothing to do with the collective search for truth or the
processes of self-government, or for any other conceptualization of the
common good." It is a right to speak one's mind defiantly, robustly, and
irreverently, just because it is one's mind.' 2
2. The "Negative" Side of Free Speech. The "negative" side approaches the
first amendment as a problem to be got around whenever it interferes with
5. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Law ofDefamation § 1.07 (Clark Boardman, 1986); Edward
J. Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by Freedom of Expression,
33 Rutgers L Rev 372, 395 (1981).
6. See Thomas Irwin Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-9 (Random House, 1970).
7. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams v United States, 250 US 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). The "marketplace of ideas" is perhaps the most powerful metaphor
in the free speech tradition. See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 Duke L J 1. In 1644, John Milton wrote in his Areopagitica: "And though all the winds of
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"
8. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am Bar Found ResJ 521.
9. Free speech is an indispensable tool of self-governance in a democratic society. The
Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US
829, 838 (1978), quoting Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214, 218 (1966). Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that
those who fought for America's independence believed that "freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth." Whitney v
California, 274 US 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis concurring). See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S Ct Rev 245.
10. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130U PaLRev 591, 601-04 (1982); David A.J.
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U Pa L Rev
45, 62 (1974).
11. For a recent exposition on the value of freedom of speech as an aspect of individual liberty,
see C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford Univ Press, 1989).
12. Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power 257 (Oxford Univ Press, 1986).
Even when the speaker has no realistic hope that the audience will be persuaded to his or her
viewpoint, even when no plausible case can be made that the search for truth will be advanced,
freedom to speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction and realization of
self-identity essential to individual fulfillment.
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constructive social policy goals. The negative side begins with the
proposition that the first amendment is not an absolute and that many
recognized doctrines exist that permit speech to be regulated or punished.' 3
When presented with a problem such as hate speech, the negative first
amendment thinker says: "Here are social policy values of enormous
magnitude-equality, tolerance, and respect for human dignity-values that
are, no less than free speech, of constitutional dimension. Let us employ
every conceivable exception to protection for free expression that is currently
recognized, so that hate speech can be deterred and these laudable values
vindicated."
The negative first amendment thinker accepts freedom of speech as an
important constitutional value, but, when matters such as hate speech are at
issue, tends to look for ways to stretch the loopholes. The negative thinker
will tend to punch holes in the many classic rationales that have been
advanced to support expansive protection of freedom of speech. The poetic
power of the marketplace image, it is pointed out, is tempered by
experience. 14 Grounding freedom of speech in individual fulfillment, it is
argued, is inappropriate, for then freedom of speech becomes
indistinguishable from any other human desire, losing any claim to unique
13. See generally Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale LJ 1105 (1979).
14. When subjected to severe cross-examination, no single justification for freedom of speech is
likely to come through perfectly unscathed, and the marketplace rationale is no exception.
The marketplace of ideas is a marketplace, and like all markets, it may experience positive and
negative cycles. The marketplace image is grounded in laissez-faire economic theory. Even if we are
to accept the apparent lesson of perestroika that, on the whole, free economic markets perform more
efficiently than controlled economies, almost all governments utilize some controls on markets to
correct for excesses and imperfections that can lead to violent economic swings. The theoretical
purity of the models in economic textbooks is not matched by the actual performance of markets in
the mundane commercial world. Economists concede the necessity of using governmental
regulation to trim the freedom of markets at the edges, correcting their deficiencies in the real world
of commerce. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L
Rev 964, 974-78 (1978); Ingber, 1984 Duke LJ at 4-5 (cited in note 7).
The marketplace of ideas rationale is also ostensibly contradicted by our everyday experience.
There are as many shoddy ideas circulating as there are shoddy products. If the marketplace
produces truth, the persistence of falsity seems difficult to explain. Is there any reason to be
confident that good thoughts drive out bad ones? Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan continue to parade in
America, and racial separatism continues as the formal law of South Africa. The belief in racial and
ethnic superiority is still in wide currency throughout the world, from ethnic strife in the Soviet
republics to the tense racial politics of New York City and Washington, D.C. Institutions and
individuals across the globe continue to espouse and practice the dominance and exploitation of
women. See generally Wellington, 88 Yale LJ at 1130-32 (cited in note 13).
The hope that the marketplace will lead to truth is further eroded by the infiltration of emotional
distortions into the realm of "ideas." Irrational appeals to hate and prejudice have, throughout the
experience of man, often overwhelmed thoughtful tolerance and understanding, leading to violence
and destruction. Even if we were to accept the marketplace of ideas model as valid, therefore, it
would remain to be decided what would count as an "idea." Would it necessarily encompass appeals
to hate that shortcut the mind and speak from heart to heart, or could it be limited to speech
asserting intellectual propositions? See notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
Finally, there is a curiously ironic shortcoming to the marketplace image. We can never empirically
test the proposition that truth will triumph over error, because that would itself require some
objective measure of what ideas are true and what ideas are false-a measurement that the
marketplace theory appears to forbid. Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest
for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 Geo Wash L Rev 161, 190-91
(1972).
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shelter from interference by the state. 15  Significantly, the negative free
speech thinker is likely to single out one narrow rationale for elevating
protection of free expression-the significance of freedom of speech to the
process of self-governance-thus treating political speech as the only genre of
expression meriting heightened protection.16
3. Free Speech Theory in the Supreme Court. In the last three decades, the
affirmative side of free speech thinking has generally triumphed over the
negative. The Supreme Court has tended to accept the affirmative argument
that freedom of speech is a preferred value supported by multiple rationales,
extending generous levels of constitutional protection to a vast range of
expression. Despite the marketplace metaphor's frailties, the Court has
enthusiastically embraced it.17 The Court has declined the invitation to limit
first amendment protection to political speech. While recognizing in many
cases that political speech lies at the core of the first amendment,' 8 it has
nevertheless insisted that the "guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as
those are to healthy government."' 1 The Court has declared that the free
speech and free press guarantees "are not confined to any field of human
interest,"-20 and that "it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced . . . pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters
.... "21 Most significantly, the Court has acknowledged that the first
amendment "serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression. . 22
15. The self-fulfillment rationale has an almost unseemly ring of hedonism. Speakers claim
protection for the sheer pleasure of speaking. The objection might thus be made that to ground
freedom of speech in the self-fulfillment theory is to indulge the individual in a right of self-
gratification that legal systems have traditionally not been obliged to respect. An individual may
derive pleasure and fulfillment from many activities other than speech, and so the pleasure principle
seems insufficient by itself to justify atypical rules for speech. Individuals may also seek pleasure or
fulfillment by taking cocaine or having sex with a prostitute, but those two activities have not,
traditionally, been deemed outside the legitimate regulation of the state. Many nonspeech activities
through which individuals seek pleasure have conventionally been deemed by society as either illicit
or illegal or both, even when they involve no immediate victims, on the theory that they may tend to
cause harm. If protection of speech is linked to the pursuit of pleasure, then the state should be
permitted to regulate speech in the same manner as it regulates other pleasure-seeking activity. See
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind LJ 1, 26-28 (1971).
16. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 15-16, 24-27
(Harper, 1948); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 333 (Free
Press, 1990).
17. See, for example, Milkovich v LorainJournal Co., 110 S Ct 2695, 2705 (1990); Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v Falwell, 485 US 46, 50-51 (1988); New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
18. See note 9.
19. Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 US 374, 388 (1974).
20. United Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Assn, 389 US 217, 223 (1967), quoting Thomas v Collins, 323
US 516, 531 (1945).
21. NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 460 (1958). See also Abood v Detroit Board of Educ., 431 US
209, 223 (1977).
22. Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396, 427 (1974). The Court has thus found unpersuasive the
arguments of theorists such as Robert Bork that the self-fulfillment rationale for free speech fails to
distinguish speech from any other human desire. See Bork, 47 Ind LJ I (cited in note 15). Two
strong arguments may be asserted against Judge Bork's position. The first is a broad libertarian
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B. Hate Speech and the Affirmative Side of the First Amendment
There are a number of modem affirmative first amendment doctrines that
interlock to create a large measure of protection for hate speech.
1. Neutrality. The neutrality principle embraces a cluster of precepts that
form the core of modern first amendment jurisprudence. Mere opposition to
an idea is never enough, standing alone, to justify the abridgment of speech. 23
Government may not pick and choose among ideas, but must always be
"viewpoint neutral." 24 All ideas are created equal in the eyes of the first
amendment-even those ideas that are universally condemned and run
attack on the underlying premise that government may control most activities of human life if it can
simply point to reasonable grounds for doing so. A libertarian would argue that the presumption
should be exactly the opposite: government normally may not intervene in an individual's affairs,
and is justified in doing so only to the extent necessary to prevent the individual from harming
others. This means that many pleasure-seeking activities are beyond the legitimate jurisdiction of the
state altogether, because they harm only the individual who engages in them. The "harm
requirement" may not be satisfied merely by the outrage or moral opprobrium that the majority
attaches to the activity. Crimes must have victims-victims other than the perpetrator. In a society
organized under strict libertarian principles, free speech receives protection far higher than
unweighted balancing for the same reasons that many other forms of activity are protected: because
government is often unable to point to palpable harm caused by the activity. One need not adopt the
complete libertarian argument, however, to defeat the position that self-fulfillment is mere self-
gratification, and thus an insufficient basis for special protection for speech. A second, more modest
argument treats the self-fulfillment aspect of speech as qualitatively different from other forms of
gratification, and therefore critically important even if one is not a card-carrying libertarian. A
persuasive case can be made that speech is a form of self-gratification different in kind from most
other forms of self-fulfillment, and therefore deserving of special solicitude. We may start by
quibbling on terms. To articulate the theory in terms of "pleasure" and "gratification" is to trivialize
it. The term "self-fulfillment" connotes much more than hedonistic pleasure and gratification. The
words "pleasure" and "gratification" emphasize those aspects of human life that resemble the lives
of animals; the term "self-fulfillment" emphasizes those aspects of humanity that distinguish human
beings from other species. The fulfillment that comes from speech is bonded to the human capacity
to think, imagine, and create. Conscience and consciousness are the sacred precincts of mind and
soul. The linkage of speech to thought, to each person's central capacity to reason and wonder, is
what places it above other forms of fulfillment, and beyond the routine jurisdiction of the state. See
generally Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (cited in note 11); Redish, 130 U Pa L Rev at 601-
04 (cited in note 10); Richards, 123 U Pa L Rev at 62 (cited in note 10).
23. See, for example, Ward v Rock Against Racism, 109 S Ct 2746, 2754 (1989) ("The principal
inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.").
24. See, for example, Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 US 788, 806 (1985); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 US 37, 46, 49 n9 (1983). See generally Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L Rev 1713,
1824 (1987).
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counter to constitutional principle. 25 While the first amendment is not an
absolute, the neutrality principle is.26
2. The Emotion Principle. Constitutional protection for speech is not limited
to its cognitive content alone, but extends also to the emotional components
of speech.2 7 Speech does not forfeit the protection that it would otherwise
enjoy merely because it is laced with passion or vulgarity.28
25. This notion had its most famous articulation in a defamation case, Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 US 323, 339-40 (1974): "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." In Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2705, another
defamation case, the Supreme Court recently held that "the fair meaning of the Gertz passage is to
equate the word 'opinion' in the second sentence with the word 'idea' in the first sentence." In
Milkovich, the Court refused to create a special constitutional doctrine creating "a wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' " Id. Instead, the Court read
the Gertz passage as a restatement of the "marketplace of ideas" concept. Id. See note 7 and
accompanying text.
26. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or
disagreeable." Texas v Johnson, 109 S Ct 2533, 2544 (1989), citing Hustler, 485 US at 55-56; City
Council of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 US 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 462-63 (1980); FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438
US 726, 745-46 (1978); Young v American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 US 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976); Buckley v
Valeo, 424 US 1, 16-17 (1976); Grayned v Rockford, 408 US 104, 115 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v
Mosley, 408 US 92, 95 (1972); Bachellarv Maryland, 397 US 564, 567 (1970); United States v O'Brien, 391
US 367, 382 (1968); Brown v Louisiana, 383 US 131, 142-43 (1966); Strombergv California, 283 US 359,
368-69 (1931).
27. In Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971), for example, the Supreme Court held that it was
unconstitutional for the State of California to convict the defendant for wearing a jacket plainly
bearing the phrase "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor where women and
children were present.
Several points in Cohen merit special emphasis. First, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion
that a state may seek to prevent the use of vulgarity merely for the purpose of cleansing public
discourse and sheltering citizens from offensive language:
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right
to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most
squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping
short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-
letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it
is nevertheless true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
Id at 25.
Second, the Court made it clear that the shock value of Cohen's language did not justify the
California law. The Court rejected the assertion that the state could excise "one particular scurrilous
epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory ... that its use is inherently likely to cause
violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public
morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary." Id at 22-23.
Finally, the Court held that it made no difference that some members of the general public would
inadvertently be exposed to Cohen's vulgarity. Id at 22. The Cohen decision, it must be remembered,
involved the quintessential example of lewd or profane language-indeed, the single most offensive
word in the American vocabulary. Further, the case arose inside a courthouse, a setting in which the
state traditionally has substantially more right to regulate speech than it has in the public streets.
28. In Hustler, 485 US 46, the Court was faced with a crude parody run by Hustler Magazine
depicting Reverend Jerry Falwell as an incestuous drunk. The Court ruled without dissent that the
parody was protected under the first amendment. ChiefJustice Rehnquist conceded that the Hustler
parody was at best a distant cousin of the conventional political cartoon, "and a rather poor relation
at that." Id at 55. Rehnquist argued, however, that there was simply no way to draw a principled
distinction between the Hustler parody and other satiric efforts. "If it were possible," he stated, "by
laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would
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3. The Symbolism Principle. First amendment protection is not limited to the
use of language, but also includes expressive conduct, such as mass
demonstrations or communication through the use of symbols.29
4. The Harm Principle. While the neutrality principle forbids penalizing
speech merely because of opposition to its content, modern first amendment
jurisprudence does permit speech to be penalized when it causes harm. The
harm principle defines the types of injuries that will qualify as harms sufficient
to justify regulation of speech.30 The harm principle is a natural corollary to
probably suffer little or no harm." Id. But the Supreme Court was doubtful, Rehnquist explained,
that any reasonably concrete standard could ever be articulated. Amorphous pejoratives such as
"outrageous" or "indecent" were too subjective to withstand first amendment requirements. To
permit a jury to impose liability for mere "outrageousness" would invite jurors to base liability on
the basis of their tastes and prejudices. Id at 55. See generally, Rodney A. Smolla, Jerry Falwell v.
Larry Flynt: The First Amendment on Trial (St. Martin's Press, 1988); Paul A. LeBel, Emotional Distress,
the First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech '. A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Faiwell, 60
U Colo L Rev 315 (1989); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv L Rev 601 (1990); Rodney
A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 Ariz LJ 423
(1988).
29. As early as 1931, the Court had recognized that the constitutional protections for speech
extended to more than the use of language, encompassing communication through the use of non-
language symbols. In Stromberg v California, 283 US 359 (1931), the Court struck down a state statute
that barred displaying of a red flag " 'as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government .... ' " Id at 361, quoting Cal Penal Code § 403-a (repealed 1933). The Court ruled
that the statute was so vague that it threatened "the opportunity for free political discussion." Id at
369.
The Court's most dramatic confrontations with attempts to punish symbolic speech came in the
recent round of flag-desecration cases. In Texas v Johnson, 109 S Ct 2533 (1989), the Court
overturned the conviction of Gregory Lee Johnson, who had burned an American flag as part of a
protest during the Republican National Convention in Dallas. Justice William Brennan's opinion for
the majority was a ringing celebration of freedom of speech. The Texas statute singled out "only
those severe acts of physical abuse of the flag carried out in a way likely to be offensive." Id at 2543,
quoting Brief for Petitioner at 44. Because the conviction rested on "the likely communicative
impact of [the] expressive conduct," Brennan reasoned that the state was regulating "emotive
impact." Id. This was inconsistent with the principle that speech may never be proscribed merely
because society finds its intellectual or emotional message disagreeable. Id at 2544.
United States v Eichman, 110 S Ct 2404 (1990), was the sequel to Johnson in which the Court struck
down the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 USCA § 700 (West Supp 1990). Justice Brennan's
opinion in Eichman, rendered only a little more than a month after the cases had been orally argued
before the Court, was flat, matter-of-fact, and brief-barely eight pages long. "Although Congress
cast the Flag Protection Act in somewhat broader terms than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson,"
Justice Brennan wrote, "the Act still suffers from the same fundamental flaw: it suppresses
expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact." Id at 2409. Brennan's opinion
repeated, in relatively summary fashion, the analysis in Johnson. The government may foster
patriotism and national unity by persuasion and example, he maintained, but not by criminalizing
symbolic speech. Id at 2409, quoting Johnson, 109 S Ct at 2547, quoting West Virginia Board of
Education v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943). Brennan's opinion made only an oblique reference to
the political controversy swirling around the flag-burning issue, stating, "We are aware that
desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many." Id at 2410. But the same might be said, he
pointed out, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets, vulgar repudiations of the draft, and scurrilous
caricatures, all of which were protected under the first amendment. Id at 2410, citing Terminiello v
Chicago, 337 US 1 (1949) (religious and ethnic attacks); Cohen, 403 US 15 (vulgar draft protest);
Hustler, 485 US 46 (vicious caricature).
30. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in On Liberty, Representative
Government, The Subjection of Women: Three Essays by John Stuart Mill 5 (Oxford Univ Press, 1952);
Smolla, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev at 175-76 (cited in note 2); T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U Pitt L Rev 519 (1979).
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the neutrality and emotion principles, serving to preserve the integrity of
those two doctrines.
The possible harms caused by speech may be divided into three categories:
physical harms, relational harms, and reactive harms.
(a) Physical Harms. Speech may cause physical harms to persons or
property in a variety of ways. Speech may be used to negotiate a contract
soliciting a murder, or to commission an arsonist to burn down a building.
Speech may be used to whip an angry crowd of protesters into an emotional
frenzy, inciting them to storm barricades and throw rocks at police. The
physical violence caused by these examples carries out the wishes of the
speaker. Speech may also cause violence counter to the speaker's interests, as
when those who hear the message are so outraged that they are moved to
physical assault against the speaker.
(b) Relational Harms. Speech may interfere with relationships of various
kinds, including social relationships, commercial transactions, proprietary
interests in information, and interests in the confidentiality of
communications.
(c) Reactive Harms. Speech can cause reactive harms-injuries caused by
emotional or intellectual responses to the content of the speech. These
reactive harms may be felt by individuals, or they may be harms
conceptualized in some collective sense, such as injuries to community values
of morality or civility.
This taxonomy of harms is represented in the chart on the following page:
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CHART I
THE HARMS CHART
CATEGORY 1: PHYSICAL HARMS
INJURIES TO PERSONS
Examples:
-Solicitation of murder
-Incitement to riot on behalf of the speaker's cause
-Reactive violence against the speaker in response to the message
INJURIES TO PROPERTY
Examples:
-Solicitation of arson
-Incitement to destroy property
-Reactive violence against the property of the speaker in response to the message
CATEGORY II: RELATIONAL HARMS
INJURIES TO SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
Examples:
-Libel and slander
-Alienation of affections
INJURIES TO TRANSACTIONS OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
Examples:
-Fraud and misrepresentation
-False advertising
-Interference with contractual relations
-Interference with prospective economic advantage
-Insider trading
INJURIES TO INFORMATION OWNERSHIP INTERESTS
Examples:
-Copyright, trademark, or patent infringement
-Appropriation of name or likeness for commercial purposes
INJURIES TO INTERESTS IN CONFIDENTIALITY
Examples:
-Disclosure of national security secrets
-Unauthorized revelation of private personal information
CATEGORY III: REACTIVE HARMS
INJURIES TO INDIVIDUAL EMOTIONAL TRANQUILITY
Examples:
-Infliction of emotional distress
-Invasion of privacy caused by placing the individual in a false light in the public eye
-Invasion of privacy involving intrusion upon seclusion
-Invasion of privacy involving publication of embarrassing facts
-Distress caused by intellectual disagreement with the content of the speech
INJURIES TO COMMUNAL SENSIBILITIES
Examples:
-Insults to human dignity, such as racist or sexist speech
-Vulgarity
-Obscenity
-Interference with political or social cohesiveness or harmony arising from collective
disagreement with the content of speech
Though the harms resulting from speech are often limited to only one
category, the three categories above are not mutually exclusive. The harms
may be a blend of more than one of the categories, and any given act of
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speech may simultaneously result in all three categories of harms. For
example, a speaker might utter a slanderous remark to someone in a face-to-
face confrontation that leads to fisticuffs between the speaker and his victim.
The remark might in turn be heard by others with whom the victim has social
or business relationships, thus interfering with those relationships. Finally,
the remark might cause the victim and others in the community to experience
powerful feelings of disgust and revulsion.3'
The three categories represent a hierarchy of governmental justifications
for regulating speech. Government has the strongest case for regulating
speech posing risks of physical harms. Government's justifications for
regulating speech posing risks of relational harms are quite strong, though
not as forceful as for physical harms.
The harms posed in Category III may not be used as justifications for
regulation of speech. This rule simply restates the neutrality and emotion
principles: neither intellectual nor emotional revulsion to speech is ever
enough, standing alone, to justify its abridgment-government must instead
demonstrate an invasion of one of the more palpable physical or relational
harms listed in Categories I or II.
5. The Causation Principle. The integrity of the neutrality, emotion, and
harm principles is dependent upon the adoption of a rigorous causation rule
that requires a close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing
speech. The modern "clear and present danger" test is the most famous
articulation of the currently prevailing causation rule. In its current form, the
test provides that advocacy of force or criminal activity may not be enough
unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 32 Without a strict
causation test, government will tend to slip surreptitiously into penalizing
opinions, and into permitting regulation of speech purely because of the
31. Alternatively, any given act of communication might be relatively pure, implicating only one
type of harm. For example, a speaker might copy verbatim from someone else's copyrighted work
and sell the copies for profit, without permission from the copyright owner. This could interfere with
a relational ownership interest, but not pose any risk of physical harm or cause any negative
emotional or intellectual reaction in persons exposed to the speech. (The owner of the copyright
might, of course, be emotionally upset that someone has pirated his or her work-but that emotional
disturbance is not in reaction to the actual message but rather to the theft of his or her intellectual
property.)
32. Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969). Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally
conducted on a farm in Hamilton County, Ohio, outside Cincinnati. A local Cincinnati television
station reporter had been invited to witness the rally, and he and a cameraman filmed the event,
portions of which were later broadcast on the Cincinnati station and a national network. Id at 445.
The film footage is filled with vile, incendiary racist bile. Klan members pronounced that "the nigger
should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel," and "if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have
to be some revengeance [sic] taken." Id at 446-47.
The state of Ohio prosecuted Brandenburg, the leader of the Klan group, under an Ohio criminal
syndicalism law, which made it illegal to advocate "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform," or to assemble "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id at 444-45, quoting Ohio Rev Code Ann
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reactive disturbances it causes. Virtually any opinion might, at some
indeterminate future time, "cause" physical harm.33 Similarly, the emotional
and intellectual reactions of others to speech might ripen into violent physical
reactions at some indeterminate future time. A society will never have robust
freedom of speech if any threat of future physical harm is enough to justify
speech regulation.
6. The Precision Principle. Precision is a pervasive theme of modern first
amendment analysis. Even when regulation of speech is otherwise justified
(as when a compelling governmental interest is at stake), the regulation will
be struck down if it fails to meet both substantive and definitional precision
requirements. A substantive principle requires that regulatory mechanisms
implicating speech be precisely designed to effectuate the governmental
interest at stake. 34 A parallel rule of definitional precision requires that the
§ 2923.13 (repealed 1974). Brandenburg was convicted, fined $1,000, and sentenced to one to ten
years' imprisonment. Id at 445.
The Court held the Ohio law unconstitutional. Id at 448. No one was present at the Klan rally
except the Klan members themselves, the television reporter, and his cameraman. Id at 445-46.
Nothing in the record indicated that the orgy of race hate posed any immediate physical threat to
anyone, and the statute, either as written or applied in this case, does nothing to distinguish "mere
advocacy" from "incitement to imminent lawless action." Id at 448-49. In these circumstances, the
Court said, the Klan was guilty only of the "abstract teaching" of the "moral propriety" of racist
violence. Id at 448, quoting Noto v United States, 367 US 290, 297-98 (1961). "[Tlhe constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press," according to the Court, "do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id at
447.
33. In Hess v Indiana, 414 US 105 (1973), the defendant Gregory Hess was convicted of violating
Indiana's disorderly conduct statute in an anti-Vietnam War demonstration on the campus of Indiana
University. Between 10h and 150 demonstrators had moved onto a public street, blocking traffic.
After refusing to obey the sheriff's command to clear the street, the demonstrators were moved to
the curbs by the sheriff and his deputies. Id at 106. As the sheriff passed by Hess, Hess said, "We'll
take the fucking street later." The sheriff immediately arrested Hess for disorderly conduct, and he
was convicted. Id at 107.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that Hess could not be convicted merely for
having used the word "fuck," since that word standing alone did not satisfy the legal definition of
obscenity. Id. Nor could Hess's statement be seen as a direct verbal challenge to fight the sheriff or
his deputies-witnesses testified that he was facing the crowd, not the street, when he made the
statement and that his words did not appear to be addressed to any particular person or group. Id at
107-08. Turning to the Brandenburg standard, the Court held that Hess was not guilty of any
incitement to imminent lawless action. Id at 108-09. The words "We'll take the fucking street later,"
the Court maintained, could be taken as a counsel for "present moderation" or as advocacy of illegal
action "at some indefinite future time," neither of which were enough to constitute a present threat
of imminent disorder. Id at 108.
34. This substantive precision principle is a component of both the "strict scrutiny" level of
judicial review applicable to content-based regulation of speech and the reduced level of scrutiny
applicable to non-content-based regulation. See, for example, Sable Communications of California, Inc. v
FCC, 109 S Ct 2829, 2836 (1989) (government may only "regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest"); O'Brien, 391 US at 377 (When government regulation is "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression," the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms" must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."). See also Board
of Trustees of State University of ,ew York v Fox, 109 S Ct 3028, 3035 (1989)(requiring a "reasonable" fit
between means and ends in commercial speech cases). These substantive first amendment standards
are discussed in greater detail in notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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terms used to identify proscribed speech be defined with a meticulous
exactitude well beyond that of other routine legislation, so that speakers know
in advance what speech is and is not permitted, thereby avoiding the self-
censorship caused by uncertainty.3 5
C. Hate Speech and the Negative Side of the First Amendment
Modern first amendment jurisprudence does permit expression to be
penalized in a number of circumstances arguably applicable to hate speech.
1. The Two-Class Theory. Back in an older and simpler time in the history of
free expression, the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory that treated
certain types of expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of
the first amendment.3 6 The most celebrated statement of this view appeared
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:3 7
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
38
Hate speech is clearly within the Chaplinsky litany. In common sense
understanding a vulgar racial slur may variously be described as "lewd,"
"obscene," "profane," "libelous," or "insulting," and thus the very type of
expression "the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem." And indeed, in 1952, when this
two-class theory of the first amendment was still flourishing, the Court upheld
a criminal conviction for spreading racist hate speech. In Beauharnais v.
Illinois,39 the Court was faced with a criminal libel case involving an Illinois
statute that criminalized any publication portraying "depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion" exposing them "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is
productive of breach of the peace or riots." 40 The defendant Beauharnais was
president of a racist Chicago organization, the White Circle League, which
had distributed racist leaflets. 4 1
35. The first amendment thus imposes meticulous tolerance levels on the "engineering" utilized
in speech laws. This is reflected in rules such as the "overbreadth" and "vagueness" doctrines. See
Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601 (1973); Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518 (1972); Baggett v Bullitt, 377 US
360 (1964).
36. See generally Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 77-106 (Harper &
Row, 1988).
37. 315 US 568 (1942).
38. Id at 571-72, citing Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Harvard Univ Press,
1941).
39. 343 US 250 (1952).
40. Id at 251, quoting Ill Rev Star ch 38, § 471 (1949).
41. Id at 252. The leaflets called on the mayor and city council of Chicago "to halt the further
encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and
persons, by the Negro," and exhorted "[olne million self respecting white people in Chicago to
unite," proclaiming that "[i]f persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming
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In his defense to the Illinois criminal prosecution, Beauharnais asked that
the jury be instructed that he could not be found guilty unless the leaflets
were "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. ' 42 The
Illinois court refused to use this instruction, and Beauharnais was convicted. 43
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Felix
Frankfurter. 44 If such a two-class theory of the first amendment still survived,
hate speech could be punished with impunity. But the theory is no longer
viable; modern first amendment principles have passed it by,4 5 and
Beauharnais is no longer good law. The Court no longer accepts the view that
speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," or
otherwise vulgar or offensive-the decisions in cases such as Cohen 4 6 and
Hustler4 7 are illustrative-and libelous speech is no longer beyond first
amendment protection.4 8  Only one small piece of the two-class theory
survives: the Court continues to treat "obscene" speech as not within the
protection of the first amendment at all. 49
2. The Fighting Words Doctrine. While the methodology of Chaplinksy has
been repudiated (for all but obscene speech), the so-called "fighting words"
doctrine remains alive, as modified by the current rigorous clear and present
danger test. Thus a verbal attack directed at a particular individual in a face-
to-face confrontation that presents a clear and present danger of a violent
mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns
and marijuana of the negro, surely will." Id.
42. Id at 253.
43. Illinois v Beauharnais, 408 Ill 512, 97 NE2d 343 (1951).
44. Justice Frankfurter's opinion contained only a short-but interesting-discussion of
freedom of speech. It had been argued against the Illinois law that prohibiting libel of a creed or a
racial group is "but a step from prohibiting libel of a political party." 343 US at 263. Frankfurter
clearly thought, however, that a sharp first amendment distinction existed between restrictions on
political speech and restrictions relating to "race, color, creed or religion." Id at 263 n18. These
terms, he insisted, had "attained too fixed a meaning to permit political groups to be brought within"
their rubric, and for Frankfurter that rubric was apparently outside the protections of the first
amendment. Id. "Of course," he noted, "discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as the
duty, of criticism must not be stifled." Id at 264. But for Frankfurter there was nothing "political"
about this speech, nor did it rise to the level of "discussion." "If a statute sought to outlaw libels of
political parties," he conceded, "quite different problems not now before us would be raised." Id at
263 n18. Frankfurter was confident that "[wihile this Court sits, it retains and exercises authority to
nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel." Id at
263-64 (citation omitted).
45. See Cohen, 403 US 15; Hustler, 485 US 46.
46. 403 US 15.
47. 485 US 46.
48. In a line of cases emanating from Sullivan, 376 US 254, the Court has created significant first
amendment protections for libelous speech. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v Hepps, 475 US 767
(1986); Gertz, 418 US 323.
49. In Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 485 (1957), the Court held that "obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The legal definition of obscenity has gone
through several mutations since Roth, but the basic principle that obscene speech is not
constitutionally protected remains. See Pope v Illinois, 481 US 497 (1987); Miller v California, 413 US
15 (1973).
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physical reaction may be penalized. 50 A statute aimed at hate speech that only
penalizes such "fighting words" confrontations, and that is applied to require
a governmental showing of imminent danger in every individual case, would
be constitutional. 5 1 Such a statute or regulation might also be symbolically
valuable, for it at least makes some statement concerning human dignity and
the repugnance of society for hate speech attacks. A mere fighting words
statute, however, will reach only a small percentage of hate speech. 52
3. Content-Neutral Protection of Persons or Property. The clear and present
danger test permits speech to be penalized when it is on the brink of erupting
into violence against persons or property. 53 Once physical injury to persons
or property has taken place, criminal and tort rules of general application may
be brought to bear upon the wrongdoer, and it is no defense that the persons
were injured or the property destroyed in the cause of free expression. There
is no first amendment right to commit physical assault or damage another's
property. Under the principles established in United States v. O'Brien,54 when
the government promulgates a rule for reasons unrelated to the content of
50. In Cohen, 403 US at 20, the Court "restated" the fighting words doctrine of Chaplinsky,
superimposing upon it the requirements of a rigorous clear and present danger test. The Court in
Cohen thus emphasized that in that case no one was present who would have regarded Paul Cohen's
speech as a "direct personal insult," nor was there any danger of reactive violence against Cohen. Id.
51. In this sense the "fighting words doctrine" is not a discrete, free-standing doctrine at all, but
merely a specific application of the general clear and present danger test.
It should be emphasized that the rigors of the clear and present danger test must be satisfied case
by case. There was a time in our first amendment jurisprudence in which it was taken for granted
that a legislature could effectively "precertify" certain identified classes of speech as satisfying the
clear and present danger test. This was one of the principal themes in Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652
(1952), in which the Court approved proscription of utterances which, "by their very nature, involve
danger to the public peace and to the security of the State." Id at 669. You can't start a fire without a
spark, and the Court was convinced that a "single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that,
smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration." Id.
The Court in Gitlow did not require that foreseeable harm be demonstrated in each individual
prosecution. Id at 670. Rather, the legislature could make a generic determination applicable to a
broad class of speech, and thereby estop individuals from claiming that their particular speech posed
no serious threats. Thus the Court admonished,
when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its
discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited
class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to
consideration.
Id.
This device of deference to generic legislative determinations has been abandoned in
contemporary first amendment doctrine. In Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virgmina, 435 US 829, 843
(1978), for example, the Court stated flatly that "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit
judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake." And in Cohen, 403 US at 20, the Court
rejected the view that the state could specify in advance language that is "inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction."
52. Smolla, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev 171 (1990) (cited in note 2).
53. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
54. 391 US 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court upheld convictions for burning draft cards to
protest the Vietnam War. The protesters argued that burning a draft card was a form of political
protest, and that Congress had purposefully intended to censor freedom of speech in amending
federal law to prohibit mutilation of the cards. Id at 376. The Supreme Court refused to scratch
beneath the surface of Congress' intent and upheld the convictions. Id at 376-77. O'Brien's burning
of his draft card, the Court reasoned, involved a mixture of "speech" and "conduct." Id at 376.
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expression, and the governmental interests at stake are substantial, the
regulation will normally be upheld even though it may have the incidental
effect of interfering with speech.
A student who spray-paints a hate message on the side of a university
building might thus be prosecuted for damage to the property. 55 If the
university were to engage in selective prosecutions, however, punishing those
who desecrate university property with hate speech but ignoring desecration
Whenever "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same activity, the Court held,
the government is permitted to regulate the activity if can meet a four-pronged test:
(1) the governmental regulation must be "within the constitutional power of the
Government";
(2) the regulation must further an "important or substantial governmental interest";
(3) the governmental interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression";
and
(4) the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Id at 377 (citation omitted). The Court's application of this test in the O'Brien case itself was
disingenuous-the only credible reading of Congress' intent was that it did wish to stifle dissent by
banning mutilation of draft cards as a form of protest. But the basic conceptual point of O'Brien was
sound and remains an integral part of modern first amendment jurisprudence. When governmental
intent is truly "clean," and genuinely unrelated to the suppression of free expression, then a
standard of judicial review less stringent than strict scrutiny is warranted for the incidental
"spillover" effect that the law has on free speech.
55. The key here is the third prong of the O'Brien test; it is the "gatekeeper," so to speak,
governing entrance to the lower standard in O'Brien. This prong is crucial; much of modem first
amendment law turns upon how it is interpreted. Under prong three, the governmental interest
used to justify the law must be "unrelated to the suppression offree expression." Id at 384. What does this
phrase mean? In fact, this phrase is susceptible to two different interpretations, and the level of
protection for free speech in our society is largely bound up in which of those two meanings we
choose.
The first possible interpretation of the phrase "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"
is that government must have some reason other than a desire to censor speech as the rationale for
its regulation. This seems straightforward enough. In the O'Brien case, the reason was the orderly
administration of the selective service system. What could be simpler? The difficulty comes from
this: all laws restricting freedom of speech are passed because of some "interest unrelated to free
expression."
Governments pass laws restricting freedom of speech because they fear physical violence against
persons or property, or because they are concerned about maintaining national security, or because
they wish to shelter other citizens from attacks on their reputation, or invasion of their privacy, or
insults to their human dignity, or because they wish to protect community morals, or promote
tolerance, or encourage cohesiveness-governments pass laws restricting freedom of speech for all
of these reasons and many more, and in every instance it is possible to characterize the governmental
goal as "unrelated to free expression." No law abridging freedom of speech is ever promoted as a
law abridging freedom of speech. The preambles to statutes never announce: "Whereas, there is a
social interest in the suppression of free expression, be it enacted .... Because legislatures that
pass laws restricting speech always have, as their ultimate goal, some perceived social interest other
than suppression of speech, there is no law that could not qualify for the lenient treatment of the
O'Brien test if the phrase "an interest unrelated to free expression" refers merely to that ultimate
goal. Such an interpretation of O'Brien would make defending the government nice work, for it
would insure that the tough, clear and present danger and strict scrutiny tests would always be by-
passed. We should thus label this first interpretation of the phrase the "heretical version" of O'Brien
and be constantly vigilant against its use.
The sound interpretation of the phrase "unrelated to free expression" focuses not upon the
ultimate goal of the legislation, but rather upon whether the justifications for the law advanced by the
government have nothing to do with the communicative aspects of the conduct being regulated.
When the dangers that allegedly flow from the activity have nothing to do with what is communicated,
but only with what is done, the dangers are unrelated to free expression. But when the dangers the
government seeks to prevent are dangers that it fears will arise because of what is communicated,
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with other messages, this discriminatory application of the facially neutral law,
based on the content of the wrongdoer's message, would violate the
Constitution. 56
4. Discriminatory Conduct. Just as the first amendment does not immunize
physical attacks on persons or property, it does not immunize discriminatory
conduct illegal under the equal protection clause, civil rights acts, or labor
laws. Hate speech is often used as evidence of illegal discriminatory
behavior. 57 As long as it is the underlying discriminatory behavior and not
the speech that is being regulated, the first amendment is not offended.
Under the analysis in O'Brien, the penalty exacted on speech in such cases
is incidental to the governmental purpose of regulating the purely
nonexpressive component of the conduct. 58
then the regulation is "related to free expression," and should be subjected to the clear and present
danger and strict scrutiny tests, and not to the O'Brien test.
This crucial distinction can be most easily illustrated by contrasting a "flag-burning" law with a
mere "burning" law. A mere burning law-an ordinance that forbids lighting open fires in a public
park-is a law passed to vindicate interests genuinely unrelated to free expression. The government
might pass such a law because it believes open fires in the park present fire hazards that might cause
injury to park land or patrons. The government might also pass such an ordinance as part of a more
general environmental policy, concerned with the serious air pollution effects of open fires in an
urban environment. Such an antiburning ordinance could have the incidental effect of suppressing
speech, for it would prevent persons from burning things to express themselves. (The language of
the Court in O'Bnen, it should be noted, spoke in precisely these terms, referring to "the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms." Id at 377 (emphasis added).) This incidental
impact would be purely happenstance, however, for the law was passed to prevent harms that have
nothing whatever to do with the communicative aspect of burning a flag, draft card, effigy, or any
other symbol, but rather to prevent the harms of burning, period.
When the government bans flag-burning, by contrast, it does so to prevent harms that do arise
from the communicative element of the act. Laws against flag-burning are not passed out of concern
for pollution of the physical atmosphere but out of concern for pollution of the political atmosphere.
The government does not like what burning the flag means. While it is true that government may
have, as its ultimate goal, an altruistic concern with political cohesiveness, the justifications that it
advances for banning flag-burning are based on the supposition that what is communicated by flag-
burning will tend to undermine that cohesiveness. This is the correct interpretation of O'Brien, and
for the most part the Supreme Court has been conscientious in adhering to this interpretation. The
Court has emphasized on several occasions, for example, that the test of whether a law serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is whether it is "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech." Ward, 109 S Ct at 2754.
56. The constitutional violation might be conceptualized in two ways. Discriminatory
application of an otherwise neutral law on the basis of a suspect class (such as racial identity) or the
exercise of a fundamental right (such as free speech) triggers "strict scrutiny" under the equal
protection clause and is usually a constitutional violation. Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373-74
(1886). Alternatively, the act of selective prosecution might simply be used as evidence that the
ostensibly content-neutral governmental interest is a sham, and the real motivating force is
punishment based on the content (and, indeed, viewpoint) of the speech. This showing should
disqualify the government from use of the O'Brien test, and trigger strict scrutiny under the first
amendment. Under the neutrality principle, such viewpoint-based discrimination is virtually a per se
constitutional violation. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
57. A racist remark by a public official, for example, might be used as proof of discriminatory
intent in the administration of a governmental program in a suit alleging a violation of the equal
protection clause. The racist statement could be the "smoking gun" that the disparate impact of the
program was the result of purposeful governmental discrimination. Similarly, racist speech might be
used to demonstrate a violation of federal labor laws, see Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 12 (1962), or as
proof of housing or employment discrimination in violation of civil rights acts.
58. See note 34 and accompanying text.
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5. The Theory of Hate Speech as a Relational Harm. The harm principle of
modern first amendment jurisprudence forbids punishing speech on the
ground that the message is intellectually or emotionally repugnant to a vast
majority. 59 When the speech interferes with a "relational interest," however,
it may be penalized. 60 Thus, a public figure who is ridiculed through a vicious
caricature may not recover in tort merely for the emotional distress caused by
the attack, but may recover for libel or invasion of privacy. 6'
The difference between recovery for infliction of emotional distress alone
and recovery for libel or invasion of privacy goes to the heart of the harm
principle. Permitting recovery for unvarnished emotional distress cannot be
reconciled with core first amendment principles-no matter how we dress it
up, the tort rests at bottom on the individual distress caused by the message
of the speech and on the sense of collective community outrage caused by the
violation of accepted rules of civility.6 2 These are precisely the types of harms
that modern first amendment theory disqualifies as justifications for abridging
speech. 63 The torts of libel and invasion of privacy, however, carry additional
weight; they implicate harms over and above individual psychological
disturbance or collective community outrage. Libel interferes with
reputation, a concept that the common law long ago reified as an interest
existing outside the individual persona, an intangible asset of social or
professional life that may be inventoried like any other stock in trade. 64
Similarly, the four commonly accepted forms of invasion of privacy all
implicate interests over and above mere infliction of emotional distress. 65 If
59. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
60. See text accompanying note 31.
61. Hustler, 485 US 46.
62. The writings of Professor Robert Post on the relationship of torts such as defamation,
invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress to notions of community, offensiveness, and
the purposes of the first amendment are exceptionally insightful. See Robert C. Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity and the Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Cal L Rev 297 (1988);
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 Cal L Rev
691 (1986); Post, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev (forthcoming) (cited in note 2); Post, 103 Harv L Rev 601
(cited in note 28).
63. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
64. See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132
U Pa L Rev 1, 19 (1983).
65. For the classic restatement of the elements of the four commonly recognized forms of
invasion of privacy, "false light," "intrusion," "publication of private facts," and "appropriation,"
see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal L Rev 383 (1960). The tort of appropriation, or invasion of
the "right of publicity," is the member of the privacy family that most clearly protects interests
distinct from emotional distress; it consists of exploitation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, usually
for commercial gain. See generally Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality
and History, 55 Nw U L Rev 553 (1960). The essence of false light, a close cousin of defamation, is a
falsehood placing the plaintiff in a light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 E (The American Law Institute, 1977). It thus implicates a
relational interest similar to that of defamation. The tort of intrusion involves an invasion of the
plaintiff's private space or solitude-such as eavesdropping on private conversations or peeping
through the bedroom window. See Smolla, Law of Defamation at § 10.03 (cited in note 5) (collecting
cases). Publication of private facts involves publication of true private facts that would be highly
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. See Sidis v F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F2d 806 (2d Cir
1940). Both intrusion and publication of private facts implicate "invasions" of interests distinct from
mere outrage at a speaker's message; they are forms, so to speak, of "psychic trespass." Indeed, the
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this constitutional divide is conceptually sound, where does hate speech fall in
the taxonomy of harms? Is it more like libel and invasion of privacy, or more
like intentional infliction of emotional distress? The question is close.
Looking back at Beauharnais v. Illinois,66 it is clear that Justice Frankfurter
thought that hate speech was closely analogous to libel or invasion of
privacy-and that the force of the analogy was not dissipated merely because
the slur was aimed at an entire racial group.
Frankfurter observed that if a libelous utterance directed at an individual
may be punished, "we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same
utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a willful and
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State." 67
Illinois, Frankfurter observed, did not have to look beyond its own borders
"or await the tragic experience of the last three decades" (a reference to Nazi
Germany) to conclude that purveyors of racial and religious hate "promote
strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for
free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community." 68 Recalling events
from the 1837 murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy to the 1951 riots in Cicero,
Frankfurter concluded that Illinois might well deduce that racial tensions are
exacerbated and more likely to flare into violence when racist messages are
tolerated.69
Frankfurter also argued that Illinois was entitled to conclude that the
dignity of the individual might be inextricably intertwined with protection for
the reputation of his racial or religious group. It was not for the Supreme
Court, he said, to deny that the "Illinois legislature may warrantably believe
that a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded
him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group
to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits." 70
Frankfurter's treatment of group libel as an interference with a relational
interest is not without appeal, 7' but current first amendment jurisprudence
intrusion tort requires no speech at all-though it is often committed as incident to gathering
information.
The point here is not that these privacy torts raise no first amendment problems. The tort of
publication of private facts raises such serious first amendment difficulties, for example, that its
continuing existence is in genuine doubt. See Florida Star v B.J.F, 109 S Ct 2603 (1989). The point,
rather, is that if these privacy torts are to have at least a fighting chance of survival under the modern
first amendment, they must be understood to protect individuals from interests other than mere
outrage at the content of a speaker's message. The outrage may perhaps be part of the cause of
action-as in the requirement of offensiveness that pervades privacy theory-but that offensiveness
may not stand alone. Rather, it must be incident to the invasion of some other more palpable
interest. To the extent that some of what would pass muster under the law of torts as an invasion of
privacy will not pass muster under the first amendment, the first amendment lesson is that the
privacy torts should have a structural integrity distinct from sheltering the victim from distress
caused by the content of speech.
66. 343 US 250.
67. Id at 258 (emphasis added).
68. Id at 258-59.
69. Id at 259.
70. Id at 263.
71. See Post, 74 Cal L Rev 691 (cited in note 62).
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would not accept this characterization, at least when the hate speech involves
discussion of public issues. 72 To put the doctrinal issues most simply,
Brandenburg v. Ohio would not have come out differently if Ohio had chosen to
prosecute the Klan under a group libel statute rather than its criminal
syndicalism law.73 Brandenburg must be understood as overruling Beauharnais
and eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under the same first
amendment standards as individual libel.74
6. The Public Speech/Private Speech Dichotomy. If there is an Achilles' heel to
modern first amendment jurisprudence, it is the dichotomy between speech of
"general public interest or concern" and "private" speech. In a number of
cases, the Supreme Court has held that first amendment rules highly
protective of freedom of speech do not apply with full force-and indeed, may
not apply at all-when the speech is of purely private concern. 75 The public
speech/private speech dichotomy is still in an early stage of evolution-the
72. See the textual discussion accompanying notes 75-80.
73. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
74. The Supreme Court's most recent foray into the fact/opinion distinction in libel law further
bolsters this assertion. In Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2706, the Court declined to create a special
constitutional doctrine immunizing "opinion" from defamation liability. See note 25. In a
backhanded way, however, the Court's ruling did immunize all speech that is not factual in nature
from defamation liability. The Court thus construed its prior decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 106
S Ct 1558, as standing "for the proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must be
provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations like the
present, where a media defendant is involved." Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2706. The Court similarly
relied on its prior decision in Hustler, emphasizing that an action by a public figure was precluded
under the first amendment in the absence of statements that could " 'reasonably have been
interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved.' " Id at 2705, quoting Hustler, 485
US at 50. The Court also endorsed its prior decisions in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v Bresler,
398 US 6 (1970) and Letter Carriers v Austin, 418 US 264 (1974), protecting "rhetorical hyperbole."
Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2704-05.
In Milkovich the Court thus tied first amendment requirements to the traditional common law
doctrines defining what type of speech qualifies as "defamatory." Significantly, the common law
excluded name-calling, insults, epithets, and verbal abuse from the definition of "defamatory."
Smolla, Law of Defamation at § 4.03 (cited in note 5).
75. In Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983), the Court dealt with the free speech of employees not
relating to general discussion on matters of public interest or concern, but on matters of
"insubordination" within the hierarchy of the agency. The case involved Harry Connick, the district
attorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, and Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney on Connick's
staff. A dispute between Connick and Myers arose when Connick tried to transfer Myers to a
different section of the criminal court. Myers prepared and distributed to the other assistants in the
office a questionnaire concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, their level of confidence in superiors, and whether they felt pressure from their superiors
to work in political campaigns. Connick fired Myers, declaring the questionnaire an act of
"insubordination." Id at 141.
The Supreme Court upheld the termination. Justice White noted that for "most of this century,
the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon
the terms of employment-including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." Id
at 143. After acknowledging the Holmes position and the persistence of the right-privilege
distinction, however, Justice White explicitly rejected the distinction as a legitimate framework for
analysis. Id at 147.
Yet Myers still lost her case. The Court introduced a dichotomy between speech on matters of
"public" concern and speech on matters of "private" concern. "When employee expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
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Court's few invocations of the distinction have done little to define it.76 It is
clear, however, that the phrase "general or public concern" is broad. Nothing
in the public speech/private speech distinction, for example, rolls back the
Court's expansive first amendment protection for speech on the wide range of
cultural and social topics that are unrelated to politics or self-governance. 77
Similarly, speech may qualify as a matter of public interest even though it
occurs in settings that are not part of the general arena of public discourse. 78
The confluence of first amendment doctrines that protect hate speech
uttered or published during the course of discussion of issues of public
concern, therefore, might not apply at all when the speech bears no plausible
connection to such issues. Thus, a campus newspaper running a racist parody
directed against a faculty member, or against an entire racial group, would be
fully protected, even if the parody were as vulgar and mean-spirited as the
caricature in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. Issues concerning race are
quintessentially matters of public concern. But a gratuitous racial epithet
uttered to a passerby in a context devoid of any plausible patina of intellectual
content might be a different matter entirely. 79 The brutal inarticulate speech
of the heart, uttered outside of any discussion of public issues or affairs, might
thus fall outside of the first amendment's protection entirely.8 0
D. Summary of Permissible Controls on Hate Speech
The exceptions to first amendment protection recognized under the
negative side of free speech jurisprudence permit regulation of hate speech in
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight
by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id at 146.
Similarly, in Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 US 749, 763 (1985), the Court
held that its first amendment rules governing the types of damages recoverable in defamation suits
did not apply to defamation actions not involving "matters of public concern." (The case arose out
of an erroneous and damaging credit report.)
76. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer
on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 Georgetown LJ 1519, 1540-45 (1987).
77. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
78. For example, in Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378 (1987), the Supreme Court had before it
the issue of whether an employee in a Texas county constable's office could be fired for stating, upon
hearing the news bulletin that someone had attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, "If
they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id at 380. Notwithstanding the employment setting, the
Court held that this speech was clearly on an issue of "public concern," and held that the employee
could not be fired. Id at 388.
79. This is
language that requires no more thought than the ability to spell; language that states no
fact, offers no opinion, proposes no transaction, attempts no persuasion; language that
contains no humorous punch-line, no melodic rhythm, no color or shape or texture that
might pass as art or entertainment; language that embodies emotion with no elaborative
gloss other than feeble minimum intellectual current necessary to power the use of words.
Smolla, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev at 183 (cited in note 2).
80. It is significant in this regard that the milestone modern first amendment decisions involving
emotionally graphic speech all involved speech containing a social message. See Brandenburg, 395 US
444 (racist message); Cohen, 403 US 15 (anti-war message); Texas vJohnson, 109 S Ct 2533 (anti-
patriotic message); Hustler, 485 US 46 (antireligion, antihypocrisy message). Hate speech is likely to
involve a social message-albeit repugnant and offensive. For hate speech to qualify as private
speech, it would have to be essentially devoid of any message.
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only a small number of closely confined circumstances. Sweeping
prohibitions on hate speech, patterned on the group libel notions of
Beauharnais, are unconstitutional. The only prohibitions likely to be upheld
are narrowly drawn restrictions on fighting words that present a clear and
present danger of violence,8 1 or that punish physical injury to persons or
property,8 2 or illegal discriminatory conduct, 83 or that involve purely private
speech in a context completely removed from discussion of issues of general
or public concern.8 4
III
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
A. Introduction: The "Idea of a University"
The first amendment principles canvassed above permit only the most
modest controls on hate speech. But should those rules apply with full force
on university campuses? If the regime of Beauharnais v. Illinois has been
effectively overruled in the general marketplace, might not university
campuses be treated as special settings, walled off from the general
marketplace, in which the principles of Beauharnais still reign supreme?
From the perspectives both of first amendment jurisprudence and of
notions of academic freedom, resolution of the conflicts posed by hate speech
inevitably turns on how society conceives the idea of a university. What is this
idea? Randolph Bourne in 1917 spoke fondly of the "old, noble ideal of a
community of scholarship." 85 There is an endearing image of the university
as set off from the rest of society-not disconnected or irrelevant, but still
somehow specially removed, an island of retreat for the life of the mind. The
phrase "academic freedom" conjures up this image of insularity. Wrapped in
the phrase are the many claims and intuitions that because the university is
special-specially important and specially vulnerable-policies and rules
binding on the rest of society should not always apply to it. Campuses today
are under pressure from many quarters to compromise the noble idea of the
university as an island of intellectual inquiry and robust discourse that ought
to maintain some degree of separation from the commands of the sovereign,
the tantalizing seductions of gigantic financial grants, and the whimsical ebbs
and flows of mass politics and prejudice.
But if a university is an island, what kind of island is it? For many, its
principal distinguishing characteristic is unfettered expressive freedom. The
university is a libertarian island, the one place that embraces, heart and soul,
81. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
82. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
83. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
84. Given the relatively primitive state of the "public speech/private speech" dichotomy, the
legitimacy of this final "private speech" exception is far from certain. See notes 16-22 and
accompanying text.
85. Randolph S. Bourne, The Idea of a University, in Carl Resek, ed, War and the Intellectuals: Essays
by Randolph S. Bourne (1915-1919) 152, 154 (Harper & Row, 1964).
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John Stuart Mill's wide-open marketplace. For others, however, Bourne's
phrase "a community of scholarship" seems more apt, with emphasis on the
word "community." The university is an island of equality, civility, tolerance,
and respect for human dignity; a place where the contemplative and rational
faculties of man should triumph over blind passion and prejudice.
These two images live side by side on campus. Most faculty, students, and
administrators are attracted to both ideas and are discomfited when they
conflict.
8 6
B. Universities and the Concept of Open Forums
The free speech status of a state college or university is governed by a
branch of first amendment jurisprudence known as "public forum law." 8 7
The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct categories of public forums.
The first, the traditional or quintessential public forum, consists of places
such as streets or parks that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."88 Content-based regulation of speech in a traditional public
forum is governed by the strict scrutiny test: the regulation must be necessary
to serve a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.8 9 Content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of
speech in a traditional public forum is permitted if it serves an "important,"
"significant," or "substantial" governmental interest, is narrowly tailored to
achieve the interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication. 90
The second category, the designated open public forum, consists of public
property opened by the state for indiscriminate use as a place for expressive
86. See notes 2-3.
87. In exploring the idea of a university, it is necessary to distinguish between matters of
constitutional law and of academic policy. State institutions, bound by the Constitution, do not enjoy
unfettered freedom to choose between the libertarian and communitarian models of university life.
Their choices are constricted by first amendment public forum law, which in turn controls whether
the constitutional principles of the general marketplace will or will not be activated on the campus.
For private universities, identical choices exist-but they are choices of policy, not constitutional law.
This article examines the constitutional public forum law applicable to state universities. The
constitutional law conclusions drawn herein, however, are also intended to apply fully to private
universities--even though private universities are not legally bound to accept them. That,
admittedly, is itself an enormously fertile ground for debate: should private universities conduct
themselves as if they are bound by the first amendment? (The issue, of course, is not unique to the
topic of hate speech.) The assumption made in this article is that the noble idea of a university
explored here recognizes no distinction between state and private institutions, because it behooves
any university that aspires to greatness to organize itself according to principles of freedom of speech
that are at least as protective as those of the Constitution. But obviously, it is for private universities
to ask themselves whether they feel it is appropriate to truly take the first amendment to heart. Space
does not permit a full treatment of this issue in this article.
88. Hague v CIO, 307 US 496, 515 (1939).
89. Care,, 447 US at 461-62.
90. See, for example, Pen-
, 
Education Assn, 460 US at 46; United States Postal Serv. v Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 US 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Serv. Comm n, 447 US
530, 535-36 (1980).
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activity. If the government intentionally dedicates a piece of public property
to the public at large for assembly and speech, then it will be bound by the
same standards applicable to a traditional public forum. Content-based
regulation of speech in a designated open public forum must thus satisfy the
strict scrutiny test. 91 A state is "not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of the facility," 92 but as long as it does so, the strict scrutiny test
applies. 93
The third category, the nonpublic forum, consists of publicly owned
facilities that have been dedicated to use for either noncommunicative or
communicative purposes, but have never been designated for indiscriminate
expressive activity by the general public. "[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government."9 4
The content-based regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum is not
governed by the strict scrutiny test, but by a "reasonable nexus" standard.
The government "may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view." 95 Entire classes of speech thus may be excluded from a
nonpublic forum. Those classes may be identified by content, as long as the
exclusion is reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and there is no
discrimination among viewpoints within a class. "Control over access to a
nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as
the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral." 96
How should a state university campus be classified for first amendment
purposes? The soundest view is to treat the campus not as one unified forum,
but as subdivided into multiple forums to which differing free speech
standards apply. On the grounds of every state university campus, for
example, are located traditional public forums, which serve as the functional
equivalent in campus life of the Boston Common, the Washington Mall, or the
streets and sidewalks in front of the seat of government. Of course, the
geography of campuses differs-at some universities, this traditional forum
may be the open campus green or plaza, at others it may be the entrance to
the student union or the main classroom building. But every state campus,
like every city, should be understood to have at least one location
91. See, for example, Cornelius, 473 US at 802-03; Perry Education Ass'n, 460 US at 45-46.
92. Perry Education Ass n, 460 US at 46.
93. Id. The same legal standards for regulating speech thus apply to Category I traditional
forums and Category II designated forums. The only difference between the two categories is that
the government has no control over the status of a traditional forum (the United States could not
take the Washington Mall out of circulation as a traditional public forum) but government may by
designation move a public facility in or out of Category II status. Cornelius, 473 US at 802-03; Perry,
460 US at 46-47.
94. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 US at 129.
95. Perr', 460 US at 46 (emphasis added), citing Greenburgh Civic Ass ns, 453 US at 131 n7.
96. Cornelius, 473 US at 806 (emphasis added).
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permanently dedicated to wide-open discourse, a first amendment "free fire
zone" in which the principles of free speech in the open marketplace apply
with undiminished force. 97
In addition, most state universities should be treated as having turned
large parts of their campuses into designated public forums. The Supreme
Court's most significant foray into this issue came in its 1981 decision in
Widmar v. Vincent,9" involving the University of Missouri at Kansas City. The
university's stated policy was to encourage. the activities of student
organizations, and it officially recognized over 100 student groups. 99 The
university regularly provided facilities for the meetings of registered
organizations; students paid an activity fee to help defray the costs to the
university.' 00 From 1973 until 1977, a registered religious group named
Cornerstone, an organization of evangelical Christian students from various
denominational backgrounds,' 0 ' regularly sought and received permission to
conduct its meetings in university facilities. 10 2  In 1977, however, the
university informed the group that it could no longer meet in the university's
buildings.' 0 3 The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted in 1972 by
the university, forbidding the use of university facilities "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching."' 1 4 The university defended its
regulation on the grounds that the prohibition was necessary to avoid a
violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment.1 5 The Supreme
Court rejected this defense and held the Missouri restriction
unconstitutional. ' 0 6 The Court reasoned that permitting a student religious
group to use the university's facilities on the same terms as other student
groups could not be construed as an implicit endorsement of the religious
group's message, and that therefore the establishment clause was not violated
by letting the religious group in. 10 7 The University had designated its
facilities as open forums, the Court held, and consequently could not
discriminate against religious speech. 08 "The Constitution forbids a State to
97. This requirement is analogous to so-called "green space" restrictions common in modern
land use and environmental regulation. In order to preserve the environmental quality of life in
every area developed for residential or business use, green space regulations require developers to
maintain a specified ratio of developed spaces to open, or green, spaces. We might think of the
general marketplace of speech as the green spaces of discourse. Governments own a substantial
amount of the space on which this discourse occurs-public parks, streets, sidewalks, plazas,
stadiums, auditoriums, and so on. It is essential that, in any given community, sufficient open
physical space be dedicated to the general marketplace. For unless we think of these spaces as
subject to a perpetual public "easement" for free speech, government could dramatically curtail
much of the speech most vital to the general marketplace, such as mass protest demonstrations.
98. 454 US 263 (1981).
99. Id at 265.
100. Id.
101. Idat265n2.
102. Id at 265.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id at 270-71.
106. Id at 267.
107. Id at 273-74.
108. Id at 267-70.
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enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public," the
Court stated, "even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place."' 0 9
What does Widmar really mean? Does it require universities to permit all
forms of hate speech on campus that must be tolerated in the general
marketplace? Widmar might be understood as standing for the proposition
that, by virtue of the large quantity of diverse speech customarily permitted
on state campuses, they are in all respects designated open public forums.
That view, however, reads more into Widmar than it will legitimately bear,
since there was never really any contest concerning the open forum status of
the particular university facilities at issue in Widmar.t t0
The Widmar decision does not stand for the proposition that a state
university is compelled by the first amendment to treat all places at all times as
open public forums. As support for this assertion, consider the following
problem. Justice White argued in dissent in Widmar that the university should
be permitted to exclude religious worship and services from its facilities, even
if it were required by the first amendment to permit access to other forms of
religious speech.III Thus the university would have to permit a Catholic
student group access to its classrooms for a meeting, but not permit access for
the celebration of Mass. A majority of the Court, however, rejected Justice
White's argument, refusing to accept any distinction between religious
worship and other forms of religious speech in an open forum.
Now imagine that a professor at the University of Missouri wishes to open
his history of religion class, which is conducted in the same classroom in
which the student religious group regularly meets by instructing the students
to bow their heads and join him in reciting the Lord's Prayer. Surely this
instruction would violate the establishment clause. The act of a university
official leading a captive group of students in a prayer is totally distinct from a
group of students meeting voluntarily on their own to pray. The professor
could not successfully defend his actions by asserting that the classroom is an
open forum under Widmar and that, under first amendment principles or
principles of academic freedom, he has a right to lead his students in prayer to
commence his class. The constitutional calculus changes as the function of
109. Id at 267-68.
110. There was no contest in Widmar over the open public forum status of the classroom facilities
(outside of normal class usage) on the University of Missouri's Kansas City campus. The university
did not defend its position on the basis that it had created only a nonpublic forum for these facilities,
nor did it attempt to avoid application of the strict scrutiny test. Rather, the university argued that its
interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state created a compelling state interest
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court in Widmar therefore accepted as a
given that the facilities at issue on the Missouri campus were open public forums, and it constantly
emphasized the breadth of those forums. The Court referred to the Missouri campus as "a forum
generally open to the public," id at 268, "a public forum," id at 270, a "public forum, open to all
forms of discourse," id at 273, an "open forum," id at 274, and "a forum generally open to student
groups." Id at 277. The Court noted that "the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as
well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC." Id at 274.
111. Id at 282-89 (White dissenting).
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the classroom changes.'" 2 Principles of academic freedom may well give him
a large measure of freedom to choose how he will present the history of
religion in that classroom, but that freedom does not extend to actually
conducting religious worship or services. The very distinction between
religious speech and religious worship advanced by Justice White but rejected
by a majority of the Court in the context of the university's open forum would
be valid and controlling during actual class times.
An analogous process applies to hate speech. There are settings on the
campus in which the rule of Beauharnais, and not the rule of Brandenburg,
should apply." 13 When considered against the backdrop of the complexities
of academic freedom, this distinction is most vividly demonstrated by
examining the power of a university to discipline its own employees, including
its administrators and faculty, for hate speech that would normally be
protected by the first amendment.' 14
Principles of free speech and academic freedom should certainly be
understood to give faculty a large measure of independence in how they
present materials in class on matters relating to race, sex, or sexual
orientation. Viewpoint discrimination should not be permitted, even when
the university regards the view espoused by the professor as repugnant. Thus
a professor should have the right to espouse bona fide academic opinions
concerning racial characteristics or capabilities, even though most people of
good will and good sense on the campus would find the opinions loathsome.
It does not follow, however, that the professor would have the freedom to
engage in racist, sexist, or homophobic speech attacks during class, even
though those attacks might be protected in the open marketplace. The
speech at issue in Beauharnais and Brandenburg was the same mindless racist
diatribe. The professor would have a right to engage in that sort of hate
speech in the open forums on campus, but not in the classroom, where the
rule of Beauharnais should instead govern.
112. See Rabban, 53 L & Contemp Probs 227 (cited in note 3).
113. An easy illustration involves a state university radio station run by students. Under the
Supreme Court's ruling in FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726, 747-52 (1978), the government is
permitted to exclude "indecent" speech from the airwaves, even though that speech would be fully
protected in print media. The Pacifica ruling clearly supports the FCC's authority to ban racist
speech from the airwaves. On the radio, it is the Beauharnais first amendment and not the Brandenburg
version that controls. No state university radio station could successfully claim a first amendment
right to be opted out of the rule of Pacifica on the theory that universities are open public forums in
which Brandenburg principles always apply. At least for that pocket of university discourse-the radio
waves-the more restrictive notions of Beauharnais and Pacifica would trump the open forum
principles of Widmar.
114. Academic freedom has an institutional and an individual component. In institutional terms,
it embodies the principle that universities should be kept largely free of interference from outside
forces, including the government. Much more complex is the individual component, in which
members of the university community stake out claims against interference from the university. A
faculty member or student may thus claim an individual academic freedom right to espouse theories
of racial superiority that run contrary to institutional university policy. See William W. Van Alstyne,
Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical
Review, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79 (Summer 1990); Rabban, 53 L & Contemp Probs 227 (cited in
note 3).
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Academic freedom should be understood as making the professor an
intellectual free agent, but not a behavioral free agent. The members of the
faculty act as the representatives of the university in the classroom both on
matters intellectual and on matters not plausibly related to intellectual
positions. The university is under a constitutional obligation to refrain from
stigmatizing hate speech and may likewise require the faculty, as its
representatives, to refrain from stigmatizing hate speech in the classroom. " 5
Just as a university is required to prevent its faculty from leading students in
prayer to begin class sessions-even though that prayer would be
constitutionally protected in other contexts-so too the university should be
understood as at least permitted (and arguably required) to police gratuitous
hate speech by faculty in classroom settings. It should be emphasized that this
notion that a university has greater power to control hate speech by faculty or
administrators in settings such as classrooms is not a mechanical invocation of
the right-privilege distinction, which has been thoroughly discredited in
modern constitutional law." 6 Under this distinction, which once dominated
American constitutional law, government could attach whatever conditions it
pleased to the receipt of governmental largess, including the surrender of
constitutional rights that the recipient would otherwise enjoy. Thus, a faculty
member could be told by the university, "You are free to exercise your
freedom of speech to engage in constitutionally protected hate speech to your
heart's content, but if you accept a university appointment here, you do so on
the condition that you refrain from exercising that right." The faculty
member may have a constitutional right to freedom of speech, but no
constitutional right to be a faculty member.' 7 Though the distinction has
been discredited, the underlying "beggars can't be chosers" premise of the
distinction has stamina, and it continues to surface-sometimes in disguise-
115. Stigma is at the heart of modern equal protection analysis. In Brown v Board ofEduc., 347 US
483, 494 (1954), the Court stated that to separate black children from white children solely because
of their race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." As Professor Charles Lawrence
explains, Brown held that separate was inherently unequal "because of the message that segregation
conveys-the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white
children." Lawrence, 1990 Duke LJ at 439 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in the original). In Anderson v
Martin, 375 US 399 (1964), the Court struck down a state law that required designation of the race of
candidates on ballots. The Court reasoned that while no one doubts that voters in the privacy of the
voting booth may take racial identity into account in casting their votes, the government may not
encourage that accounting by placing the race of the candidate on the ballot. Id at 402. The
specification of a candidate's race is different in kind from the designation of a candidate as
"Republican" or "Democrat." Id at 402-03. To identify candidates by race, the Court held, places
"the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls." Id at
402. Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), pronounced
as a "cardinal principle" the proposition that "racial classifications that stigmatize-because they are
drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of
government behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more." Id at 357-58 (Brennan
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
Harv L Rev 1439 (1968).
117. See McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 NE 517, 517 (1892) ("The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.").
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in modern cases. I "8 But at least in first amendment cases, the Supreme Court
consistently refuses to accept the distinction." 9 Thus, in controlling the
speech of faculty or administrators, the university is emphatically not
permitted to rely merely on the leverage of employment, but must justify its
regulation of speech according to whatever first amendment principles would
otherwise apply.
The principle just stated, however, does not mean that the status of
employment is constitutionally irrelevant to the first amendment analysis.
The particular circumstances of the employment context may supply the
government with justifications for regulating speech that would not exist
otherwise. Rather than invoking the right-privilege distinction, the
government simply would apply general first amendment principles to the
specific facts of a case. When a governmental employee speaks in part for the
government, the situation implicates a governmental interest in controlling
the content of its own speech and ensuring that it is not, for example, racially
or sexually abusive;' 2 0 the presence of this interest therefore creates a
justified opportunity for regulation.
The hate speech of students on campus is more problematic. If the setting
were high school or elementary school, the role of the school as an inculcator
of civic values would permit Beauharnais-style controls on the hate speech of
students. 12' But college students are adults. Does the idea of a university
contemplate a role for the institution as an inculcator of what might be called
academic values, as opposed to academic freedom? Might not the university
say that part of its legitimate mission is to teach students how to contend
vigorously within the marketplace of ideas while nevertheless observing
118. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The
Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 Stan L Rev 69 (1982); Rodney A. Smolla, Preserving the Bill of Rights in
the Modern Administrative-Industrial State, 31 Wm & Mary L Rev 321 (1990).
119. See, for example, Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S Ct 2729, 2735-36 (1990).
120. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S Ct at 587 n6 ("Where, as was the situation in the
academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content of speech at public educational
institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are presented because government is
simultaneously both speaker and regulator."). That the government is "simultaneously both
speaker and regulator" certainly does not mean that the government has carte blanche-for that
would be to reintroduce surreptitiously the right-privilege distinction. The notion of simultaneously
speaking and regulating, indeed, is easily abused. In Meese v Keene, 481 US 465 (1987), for example,
the Supreme Court disingenuously applied this distinction, treating the governmental requirement
that foreign films be labeled as "propaganda" as a form of government "speech," when in fact it was
purely a form of regulation. See Rodney A. Smolla & Stephen A. Smith, Propaganda, Xenophobia, and
the First Amendment, 67 Or L Rev 253, 280-83 (1988). The Court's market-participant exception to the
commerce clause is a useful analogy. States are exempted from normal commerce clause restrictions
when they act as market participants because, as mere participants, they do not impede private trade
in the national marketplace. See Reeves, Inc., v Stake, 447 US 429, 439 (1980). This immunity is
stripped, however, when the state exerts influences on the market beyond whatever natural force it
commands as a competitor. See South-Central Timber Development Inc. v Wunnicke, 467 US 82, 97-98
(1984).
121. See Hazelwood School Dist. v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 266-67 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v
Fraser, 478 US 675, 683 (1986).
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certain norms of civility?' 2 2 Might not the university claim that part of its
mission is to encourage the triumph of the rational and contemplative sides of
the intellect over passion and prejudice? 123 The answer to these questions is
bound up in yet one final aspect of the idea of a university-namely, how
universities teach.
IV
CONCLUSION
Let there be no doubt that hate speech on campus should be fought with
all the vigor a university can muster. Hate speech is an abomination, a rape of
human dignity. And let there be no inhibition in punishing hate speech in any
of the contexts in which speech may be punished under recognized first
amendment doctrines-as when it poses a clear and present danger of
violence, 24 or when it is intertwined with actual discriminatory conduct. 2 5
But outside those narrowly defined first amendment categories, the battle
against hate speech will be fought most effectively through persuasive and
creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion.
The conflict felt by most administrators, faculty, and students of good will on
most American campuses is that we hate hate speech as much as we love free
speech. The conflict, however, is not irreconcilable. It is most constructively
resolved by a staunch commitment to free expression principles,
supplemented with an equally vigorous attack on hate speech in all its forms,
emphasizing energetic leadership and education on the academic values of
tolerance, civility, and respect for human dignity, rather than punitive and
coercive measures.' 2 6 In this respect both of the grand ideas of a university
are vindicated. The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and
tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with
122. Thus the validity of the marketplace of ideas concept might be understood as contingent on
a commitment to rational thinking. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 25-26
(Cambridge Univ Press, 1982).
123. There was a time in which even mainstream free speech jurisprudence seemed to emphasize
the intellectual over the emotional. As Justice Frankfurter put it in Niemotko v Maryland, 340 US 268
(1951), "A man who is calling names or using the kind of language which would reasonably stir
another to violence does not have the same claim to protection as one whose speech is an appeal to
reason." Id at 282 (Frankfurter concurring). "Back of the guarantee of free speech," said the Court
in 1941, "lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to
the mind." Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 US 287, 293
(1941). This split between the reason and passion has now largely been swept away by the emotion
principle in modern first amendment jurisprudence. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text. It still
appears, however, in those areas in which general free speech doctrines do not apply. In the
obscenity context, for example, the Court has distinguished control of obscene speech from "control
of reason and intellect." Paris Adult Theatre I v Slayton, 413 US 49, 67 (1973).
124. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
125. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Hate speech on campus should thus be punished in
any of the situations in which such punishment is permitted under the general first amendment rules
discussed in Part II of this article. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
126. See Robert M. O'Neil, Colleges Should Seek Educational Alternatives to Rules that Override the
Historic Guarantees of Free Speech, Chron Higher Educ BI (October 18, 1989); Report of Workshop on
Racist and Sexist Speech on College and University Campuses, The Annenberg Washington
Program of Northwestern University, April 12, 1990 (copy on file with author).
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education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university
within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace.

